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Discussant's Response to
" 'Under the Spreading Chestnut Tree'
Accountants' Legal Liability—
A Historical Perspective"
Thomas A. Gavin
The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
Paul has done an excellent job of developing the history of accountants'
legal liability. The message of the paper is enhanced by his introduction of some
of the cast of characters who have helped shape the development of the
subject—from the likes of George May of Price Waterhouse to Philip Musica,
alias Frank Donald Coster, of McKesson & Robbin's.
My discussion of the content of Paul's paper will not address the factual
settings which underlie the "landmark'' cases presented nor will it address the
general description of the all too well known tightening of accountants' liability.
Rather, my comments will be restricted to expanding some topics discussed by
Paul and possibly taking issue with respect to a few.

Whose Duty to Whom?—Some General Observations
The author presents the expansion of the role and responsibilities of the
public auditor as one resisted and fought aggressively by auditors. Furthermore, he notes that "changes were frequently the result of litigation losses
and/or government intervention.''
One might respond that the first of these observations is accurate but a
realistic occurrance due in part to a rather young profession trying tofind its
way to maturity while at the same time attempting to avoid the risks that might
abate the maturation process. The second comment about change resulting
from litigation could apply to many disciplines. Practicing professionals do not
allocate resources to develop procedures to prevent problems unless significant problems exist or critical problems are perceived as imminent. Some
might criticize this rather sympathetic response by stating that the accounting
profession has done too little too late. The Moss-Metcalf and Dingell committees might be among those critics.

Professionalism
I believe the examination of the legal liability of accountants cannot be
viewed as a single issue but must be couched in terms of the degree or extent
to which we view accounting as a profession. The degree of professionalization
of any occupation depends on how many of the following characteristics, and
how much of each, it possesses:
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a) General, systematic knowledge.
b) Authority over clients.
c) Community rather than self-interest; symbolic rather than monetary
rewards.
d) Self-control.
e) Recognition by the public and law of professional status.
f) A distinctive culture.
Eliot Friedson, on the other hand, contends that the sole defining characteristic
of a profession is its convincing of the public and the state of its right to selfcontrol over work-related matters (Ritzer, 1972). Students of accounting
history would have no problem seeing the relationship between all or part of
these two definitions of a profession and their own accounting profession.

A State of Change
A seesawing relationship does exist between the development by CPAs of
professional auditing standards and the liabilities of CPAs as public auditors to
their clients and the public. This seesawing seems quite appropriate given the
dynamic nature of both the accounting profession and our society's socialeconomic structure. Organizations and institutions, including professions, are
expected to be responsive to the changing needs of the society in which they
operate. Unobservant, rigid, and less responsive organizations and professions
go the way of the dinosaur.
Our mission should be to carry on a continuing dialogue with the users of
our products and services in a positive, nonadversarial way. Unfortunately,
much of our profession's highly publicized communication with users has been
through their representatives, Moss-Metcalf and more recently Dignell, and
the judicial system. More has been written on the users' lack of understanding
of accountants' products and service than has been written to address and
overcome the problem.

Sharing the Blame
The author raises two issues about the responsibility of employers for the
acts of employees. Thefirst relates to adverse interest analysis. The second
relates to the double standard held by the courts; CPAfirms appear to be held
to a higher standard of supervision for their employees than do clients in
supervising their employees.

Fraud or Poor Quality Control
Originally, the employer was responsible for the acts of his employee
(agency theory—respondeat supervisor) when the latter acted beyond the
scope of employment (adverse to the interest of the employer) if the employer
was "contributorily negligent" because of failure to avoid the loss by not
exercising reasonable care in supervising employee(s). This standard was
diluted by the "modified contributory negligence test" which narrowed the
employer's exposure to liability. The employer now must somehow contribute
to the auditor's inability to detect the employee's fraud.
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I would like to make two comments in response to what Paul has said about
adverse interest analysis. First, as much attention as employees' fraud
receives and as devastating as it is on employers (clients), the CPAfirms, and
the shareholders, fraudulent activities by employees account for only a small
percentage of the accountants' liability problems. St. Pierre and Anderson
undertook a study which showed that of 334 errors found in 129 law cases
examined, only 13 percent related to client (employee) fraud while 33 percent
and 15 percent related to problems interpreting accounting principles and
auditing standards, respectively (St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984).
Second, the GAO recently issued a report stating that CPAs did not
satisfactorily comply with standards on 34 percent of the governmental audits
they performed, and more than half of the unsatisfactory audits had severe
violations of standards. Two prominent problems identified were insufficient
audit work in testing compliance with governmental laws and regulations and
the evaluation of internal accounting controls. Smaller CPAfirms had greater
problems in complying with standards (GAO, 1986). One might conclude from
the above discussion that CPAs have a problem with the professional characteristic of "self-control" as mentioned earlier in my remarks.

Spotlight on Management and the Board
Let's assume that material employee fraud, regardless of the small
frequency cited above, induces a state of trauma for the client, the public
auditor, investors and creditors. Are we, as accountants, to accept the courts'
shifting of burden to accountants with the formulation of the modified contributory negligence test? I think not! Clearly, the courts and users have fallen into
the expectation gap, the area where perceived levels of responsibility for such
things as fraud detection and compilation and review services exceed the
auditors' actual responsibility as expressed in professional standards and
determined by reasonable cost-benefit considerations. We must educate all
user groups including primary users such as investors and creditors, as well as
the secondary user groups composed of individuals in the judicial and legislative
branches of government.
I do agree with the author that the courts have gone too far in holding
auditors more responsible than the client's management and board for an
employee's action that is clearly beyond the scope of legal and reasonable
business practice. Of the four most commonly identified management functions
of planning, organizing, directing, and controlling, the courts seem to be
overlooking the last of the four functions. Broadly stated, controlling is the
process by which managers determine whether organizational objectives are
achieved and whether actual operations are consistent with plans.
The four management functions are interrelated and should not be viewed
as separate or discrete. All management functions may be viewed within the
context of control systems with the following objectives (IIA, 1978):
1. reliability and integrity of information;
2. compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws and regulations;
3. safeguarding of assets;
4. economical and efficient use of resources; and
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5. accomplishment of established objectives and goals for operations
and programs.
One might assume that the more effectively these control objectives are
achieved, the better the firm's managment.
Our socio-economic structure often permits an inbalance, for a certain
period of time, before adjustments are subsequently induced to return to what
society views as an equilibrium. Forces have been at work for more than ten
years to induce changes to check the undesirable behavior of corporate
managements and boards. These changes include:
1. passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977;
2. adoption of audit committees by many corporate boards;
3. introduction and/or enhancement of the internal audit function in
corporations; and
4. the collapse of the "good old boys" boardroom environment.
Collectively, these four changes have had, and will continue to have, a
dramatic influence on improving corporate accountability. An additional potential influence, but one that has yet to produce benefits because its work is not
completed, is the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Recently, the Commission's chairman, James C. Treadway suggested a
mandatory expanded role for internal auditors in some circumstances (IAA,
1986).
The items in the two previous paragraphs have heightened the independence and, in a general professional sense, the authority of the public auditor
over the client. As a result, CPAs now have a stronger degree of professionalism.

Supervision of Staff
Turning to Paul's comment on the double standard of the court, i.e., CPA
firms appear to be held to a higher standard of supervision for their employees
than do clients in supervising their employees. My response is: why not?
Professionals should be held to a higher level of care than non-professionals.
Firms that are members of the AICPA Division of CPA Firms are obligated
to adhere to quality control standards promulgated by the institute. Quality
control standards, among other things, call for establishing policies and
procedures for supervising the work of firm personnel. Seven of the nine
elements of quality control relate directly tofirm personnel (AICPA, 1986).
The fact that the profession has taken such a step attests to the fact that the
profession has attempted to meet its responsibility to society. Unfortunately,
membership in the division is not mandatory for all firms.

A Matter of Perspective
Any discussion about expanding the classes of plaintiffs who should be
permitted to be successful in their suit against the auditor is always explosive.
Discussants generally have a hard time balancing their own economic interests
with the general social good.
The courts, social commentators, and critics have had a hard time applying
existing responsibility models to the accounting profession. What other
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profession gets paid by the party with whom they contracted while the benefits
of that relationshipflow, in many cases, to their parties, aptly coined by Judge
Cardoza, "an indeterminate class"? The courts have had difficulty reconciling
the amount of the public auditor's responsibility with the amount of loss
suffered by potentially great numbers of people the public auditor himself
admittedly intends the product of his attest function to serve. At the extreme, a
judge, unfamiliar with all of the variables in play, might, after reading Statement
of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (FASB, 1978) think that public policy
dictates that liability for ordinary negligence be imposed on accountants for
foreseeable injuries resulting from their negligent acts.
The question is, are society's expectations realistic? Let's explore H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, one example that reflects society's expectations
through the pen of the judge who wrote the opinion1. Although the author first
discusses Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler is the initial case to hold accountants liable for ordinary negligence to
foreseeable third parties. On the surface, the logic underlying the New Jersey
Supreme Court decision appears sound. However, it isflawed. The author
recounts the court's two-step process to determine the accountant's liability. I
would like to use the same process but take a different approach than the
author in responding to the court.
The court began "first, we shall consider whether, in the absence of privity,
an action for negligent misrepresentation may be maintained for economic loss
against the provider of a service." The court continued:
If recovery for defective products may include economic loss, why
should such loss not be compensable if caused by negligent misrepresentation? The maker of the product and the person making a written
representation with intent that it be relied upon are, respectively,
impliedly holding out that the product is reasonablyfit, suitable and safe
and that the representation is reasonably sufficient, suitable and
accurate.
In response, I believe the differences found in the comparison made
between a manufacturer's product and a public auditor's opinion appear to far
outweight the similarities. The manufacturer controls, and is responsible for,
the process by which the product is made as well as the product resulting from
that process. Likewise, as pointed out earlier, the client controls, and is
responsible for, the adequacy of the accounting process and its product. The
public auditor, on the other hand, is charged to test management's assertions
which are articulated in thefinancial statements. A similar position is also held
by Gormley and Minnow (Gormley, 1984; Minnow, 1984).
The author then analyzes the court's second question—"what duty should
the auditor . . . bear to best serve the public interest in light of the role of the
auditor in today's economy?" The duty found to exist must be equated with
what is fair; the analysis of fairness "involves a weighing of the relationship of
the parties, the nature of the risks and the public interest in the proposed
solution.''
In response, the courts judging fairness in terms of the objectives of
financial reporting mentioned earlier totally avoid addressing the broader issue
which has given rise to the litigation explosion. It appears that the courts have
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rejected the idea that when professionals are working at the best of their ability,
within the concept of the average prudent auditor, there are chance occurrences that may still befall the client. The rejection of this assumption leads the
courts to accept the idea that all losses shall be borne by someone. This, in
turn, leads to the notion that the deep pocket has no bottom; a fountain of funds
for all those who, by mere chance, have suffered a loss. Courts in New Jersey,
Wisconsin, and most recently California, in International Mortgage Company v.
John P. Butler Accounting Corporation, view insurance as a readily available
vehicle for making the plaintiff whole and have extended the accountant's
liability to foreseeable parties. Resultant insurance premium increases, the
courts believe, can be passed along to all consumers.
The insurance public policy argument has been successfully employed in
many other segments of our society. So successful has been its use that the
insurance piggy bank is nearly empty.
Between 1975 and 1984 product liability cases have increased 600 percent
to approximately 10,500; suits against officers and directors have increased
more than 200 percent during the same time period (Samuelson, 1986). This
significant increase in liability cases is due primarily to the self serving interests
of the members of the Association of Trial Lawyers, whose ranks tripled in the
last 15 years to 60,000. This group has placed its own economic interests
ahead of the "public interest," or so many believe. A wave of reforms are
under consideration in state capitals and Washington. In Washington, the
Kasten bill limits the amount of contingency-fee lawyers can earn, and also
restricts joint and several liability (WSJ, 1986).

Summary and Conclusions
Survival of the profession has and will continue to be measured in terms of
the ability of its members to adapt to changes in society. Change should be
looked upon as an opportunity, an opportunity to serve, grow and mature.
The application of extending liability of accountants to reasonably foreseeable third parties will probably increase beyond the three states where it is now
applied. The profession can meet this challenge by aggressively pursuing:
• A continuing dialogue with users of financial statements as to the role
and responsibilities of the external auditor, corporate management,
and boards in thefinancial reporting process.
• Mandatory membership in the AICPA Division for CPA Firms for all
firms.
• A reasonable limitation, such as a multiple of the annual audit fee, on
the amount of liability extended to CPA defendants and elimination of
joint and several liability.

End Notes
1. 461 A 2d 138 (N.J. 1983)
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